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Most cited papers in General Decision Sciences

What are the most cited papers in General Decision Sciences?

The most cited paper in General Decision Sciences is "Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk" (Daniel J. Kahneman, Amos Tversky, 1988), with 32,957 citations. Next come "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases" (28,737) and "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice" (17,591).

Showing 50 of 97 papers. Every paper with more than 2,492 citations is listed.

Most cited papers, sortable by citations and release date
#Paper
1 Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk Daniel J. Kahneman, Amos Tversky · Cambridge University Press eBooks Book chapter 25 Mar 1988 32,957
2 Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases Amos Tversky, Daniel J. Kahneman · Science 27 Sep 1974 28,737
3 The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice Amos Tversky, Daniel J. Kahneman · Science 30 Jan 1981 17,591
4 Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty Amos Tversky, Daniel J. Kahneman · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty Oct 1992 15,858
5 A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt · The Quarterly Journal of Economics Open access Aug 1999 11,313
6 Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability Amos Tversky, Daniel J. Kahneman · Cognitive Psychology Sep 1973 10,112
7 Efficacy of the Theory of Planned Behaviour: A meta‐analytic review Christopher J. Armitage, Mark T. Conner · British Journal of Social Psychology Dec 2001 9,991
8 A Cognitive Model of the Antecedents and Consequences of Satisfaction Decisions Richard L. Oliver · Journal of Marketing Research Nov 1980 9,952
9 The case for motivated reasoning. Ziva Kunda · Psychological Bulletin 1990 8,390
10 Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. Robert B. Zajonc · American Psychologist Open access Feb 1980 7,922
11 Perceived Behavioral Control, Self‐Efficacy, Locus of Control, and the Theory of Planned Behavior 1 Icek Ajzen · Journal of Applied Social Psychology Apr 2002 7,619
12 Does the Stock Market Overreact? Werner F. M. De Bondt, Richard H. Thaler · The Journal of Finance Jul 1985 7,335
13 Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises Raymond S. Nickerson · Review of General Psychology Jun 1998 7,302
14 False-Positive Psychology Joseph P. Simmons, Leif D. Nelson, Uri Simonsohn · Psychological Science 17 Oct 2011 6,878
15 Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model Amos Tversky, Daniel J. Kahneman · The Quarterly Journal of Economics Nov 1991 6,543
16 On the psychology of prediction. Daniel J. Kahneman, Amos Tversky · Psychological Review Jul 1973 6,292
17 Rational choice and the structure of the environment. H. A. Simon · Psychological Review 1956 5,982
18 Status quo bias in decision making William F. Samuelson, Richard Zeckhauser · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty Mar 1988 5,977
19 Gender Differences in Preferences Rachel T. A. Croson, Uri Gneezy · Journal of Economic Literature May 2009 5,912
20 Risk as feelings. George F. Loewenstein, Elke U. Weber, Christopher K. Hsee et al. · Psychological Bulletin 2001 5,817
21 Toward a positive theory of consumer choice Richard H. Thaler · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Mar 1980 5,637
22 ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition Gary Eugene Bolton, Axel Ockenfels · American Economic Review Mar 2000 5,583
23 A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality. Daniel J. Kahneman · American Psychologist 2003 5,582
24 Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics Daniel J. Kahneman · American Economic Review Nov 2003 5,465
25 Choices, Values, and Frames Daniel J. Kahneman, Amos Tversky · World Scientific handbook in financial economic series Book chapter Jul 2013 5,409
26 Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making Shane William Frederick · The Journal of Economic Perspectives Nov 2005 5,408
27 Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition Jonathan St. B. T. Evans · Annual Review of Psychology Review 21 Dec 2007 5,188
28 Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias Daniel J. Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, Richard H. Thaler · The Journal of Economic Perspectives Feb 1991 5,077
29 Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness Daniel J. Kahneman, Amos Tversky · Cognitive Psychology Jul 1972 4,923
30 Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative and directive functions of affective states. Norbert Schwarz, Gerald L. Clore · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Sep 1983 4,900
31 Unrealistic optimism about future life events. Neil D. Weinstein · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Nov 1980 4,886
32 Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review Shane William Frederick, George F. Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue · Journal of Economic Literature Jun 2002 4,802
33 Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and Contagion Paul N. Rozin, Edward B. Royzman · Personality and Social Psychology Review Nov 2001 4,380
34 Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? Keith E. Stanovich, Richard F. West · Behavioral and Brain Sciences Oct 2000 4,303
35 Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Keith E. Stanovich · Perspectives on Psychological Science May 2013 4,249
36 Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler · Journal of Mathematical Economics 1989 4,217
37 The Intuitive Psychologist And His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process Lee D. Ross · Advances in experimental social psychology Book chapter 1977 4,189
38 Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty Graham Loomes, Robert Sugden · The Economic Journal Dec 1982 4,105
39 Reflective and Impulsive Determinants of Social Behavior Fritz Strack, Roland Deutsch · Personality and Social Psychology Review Open access Aug 2004 4,039
40 Heuristic Decision Making Gerd Gigerenzer, Wolfgang Gaissmaier · Annual Review of Psychology ReviewOpen access 2 Dec 2010 4,038
41 INDIVIDUAL RISK ATTITUDES: MEASUREMENT, DETERMINANTS, AND BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, David Huffman et al. · Journal of the European Economic Association Open access 31 Mar 2011 4,020
42 Bayesian t tests for accepting and rejecting the null hypothesis Jeffrey N. Rouder, Paul L. Speckman, Dongchu Sun et al. · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review Open access 16 Mar 2009 4,016
43 Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Amos Tversky, Daniel J. Kahneman · Psychological Review Oct 1983 4,013
44 Implications of rational inattention Christopher A. Sims · Journal of Monetary Economics Apr 2003 3,997
45 The Theory of Reasoned Action: A Meta-Analysis of Past Research with Recommendations for Modifications and Future Research Blair H. Sheppard, Jon Hartwick, Paul R. Warshaw · Journal of Consumer Research Review Dec 1988 3,887
46 The Explanatory and Predictive Scope of Self-Efficacy Theory Albert Bandura · Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology Sep 1986 3,809
47 Perceived stress in a probability sample of the United States Sheldon Cohen 1988 3,806
48 RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE FRAMING OF DECISIONS Amos Tversky, Daniel J. Kahneman · Cambridge University Press eBooks Book chapter 28 Oct 1988 3,764
49 The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of Social Norms P. Wesley Schultz, Jessica M. Nolan, Robert B. Cialdini et al. · Psychological Science Open access May 2007 3,714
50 Reaching a Consensus Morris H. DeGroot · Journal of the American Statistical Association Mar 1974 3,609

Citations are OpenAlex's own counts, from its 2026-09-23 snapshot, so the ranking can differ from Google Scholar or Web of Science. A paper is listed for a field when OpenAlex files it under one of the field's topics; retracted papers and papers whose citation count cannot be traced to citing works are left out, and a preprint and the article it became are shown once. Release dates are OpenAlex's: where a source gave only a month or a year, that is what is shown. How the lists are chosen.