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Most cited papers in Corruption and Economic Development

Corruption and Economic Development

What are the most cited papers in Corruption and Economic Development?

The most cited paper in Corruption and Economic Development is "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation" (Daron Acemoğlu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, 2001), with 8,584 citations. Next come "Corruption and Growth" (8,502) and "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply" (6,126).

Showing 50 of 98 papers. Every paper with more than 792 citations is listed.

Most cited papers, sortable by citations and release date
#Paper
1 The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation Daron Acemoğlu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson · American Economic Review Dec 2001 8,584
2 Corruption and Growth Paolo Mauro · The Quarterly Journal of Economics Aug 1995 8,502
3 The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply Daron Acemoğlu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson · American Economic Review Open access Oct 2012 6,126
4 The causes of corruption: a cross-national study Daniel S. Treisman · Journal of Public Economics Jun 2000 3,968
5 Corruption Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny · The Quarterly Journal of Economics Aug 1993 3,846
6 Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development Mancur Olson · American Political Science Review Sep 1993 3,845
7 The law and economics of self-dealing Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio López‐de‐Silanes et al. · Journal of Financial Economics Open access 30 Jan 2008 3,656
8 The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins Rafael La Porta, Florencio López‐de‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer · Journal of Economic Literature Open access May 2008 3,306
9 What Should Be Done with Equity Theory? Gerald S. Leventhal Book chapter 1980 2,979
10 Financial and Legal Constraints to Growth: Does Firm Size Matter? Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç‐Kunt, Vojislav Maksimovic · The Journal of Finance Open access 7 Jan 2005 2,542
11 On economic causes of civil war Paul Collier · Oxford Economic Papers Oct 1998 2,506
12 Chapter 6 Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth Daron Acemoğlu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson · Elsevier eBooks Book chapter 2005 2,457
13 Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market A.I. Khwaja, Ajmal Saeed Mian · The Quarterly Journal of Economics Nov 2005 2,442
14 Using ICTs to create a culture of transparency: E-government and social media as openness and anti-corruption tools for societies John Carlo Bertot, Paul T. Jaeger, Justin M. Grimes · Government Information Quarterly 28 Apr 2010 2,292
15 Measuring Trust* Edward L. Glaeser, David Laibson, Jose Alexandre Scheinkman et al. · The Quarterly Journal of Economics Open access Aug 2000 2,146
16 What Determines Corporate Transparency? Robert M. Bushman, Joseph D. Piotroski, Abbie J. Smith · Journal of Accounting Research 15 Apr 2004 2,101
17 Modernization: Theories and Facts Adam Przeworski, Fernando Limongi · World Politics 1997 1,999
18 Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study Richard N. Cooper, Robert J. Barro · Foreign Affairs 1997 1,984
19 Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, Luigi Zingales · The Journal of Finance 9 Nov 2010 1,932
20 Rents, Competition, and Corruption Alberto F. Ades, Rafael Di Tella · American Economic Review Open access Sep 1999 1,804
21 The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Massimo Mastruzzi · Hague Journal on the Rule of Law Open access Sep 2010 1,800
22 Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty Zia Obaid · International Review of Public Administration Apr 2013 1,761
23 Culture, openness, and finance René M. Stulz, Rohan G. Williamson · Journal of Financial Economics 12 Sep 2003 1,756
24 Tropics, germs, and crops: how endowments influence economic development William Russell Easterly, Ross Eric Levine · Journal of Monetary Economics 2003 1,742
25 Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games Elizabeth N. Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat et al. · Games and Economic Behavior Nov 1994 1,735
26 Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis Joseph S. Nye · American Political Science Review Jun 1967 1,726
27 Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies Peter Benjamin Meyer · Journal of Economic Issues Sep 1995 1,720
28 Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence Raymond J. Fisman, Jakob Svensson · Journal of Development Economics 12 Sep 2006 1,720
29 Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework Элинор Остром · Policy Studies Journal Feb 2011 1,714
30 Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia Benjamin Olken · Journal of Political Economy Apr 2007 1,630
31 The control of politicians: An economic model Robert J. Barro · Public Choice Mar 1973 1,614
32 Political risk, institutions and foreign direct investment Matthias Busse, Carsten Hefeker · European Journal of Political Economy 19 May 2006 1,600
33 Corruption and the composition of government expenditure Paolo Mauro · Journal of Public Economics Jun 1998 1,552
34 Democracy Does Cause Growth Daron Acemoğlu, Suresh Babu Krishna Naidu, Pascual Restrepo et al. · Journal of Political Economy Open access 27 Sep 2018 1,539
35 Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats Jennifer Gandhi, Adam Przeworski · Comparative Political Studies 17 Sep 2007 1,534
36 THE NORMALIZATION OF CORRUPTION IN ORGANIZATIONS Blake E. Ashforth, Vikas Anand · Research in Organizational Behavior 2003 1,529
37 What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research? Daniel S. Treisman · Annual Review of Political Science Review 4 May 2007 1,508
38 Corruption and Economic Growth Pak Hung Mo · Journal of Comparative Economics Mar 2001 1,442
39 What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions Bo Rothstein, Jan Teorell · Governance Apr 2008 1,442
40 Does flattening government improve economic performance? Evidence from China Pei Li, Yi Lu, Wang Jin · Journal of Development Economics 26 Jul 2016 1,433
41 On the Foundations of Corporate Social Responsibility Hao Liang, Luc D. R. Renneboog · The Journal of Finance Open access 6 Dec 2016 1,422
42 Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars José García Montalvo, Marta Reynal‐Querol · American Economic Review Jun 2005 1,416
43 Corruption: A Review Arvind Kumar Jain · Journal of Economic Surveys Feb 2001 1,400
44 Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries Eric Friedman, Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann et al. · Journal of Public Economics Jun 2000 1,395
45 Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries Raymond J. Fisman, Roberta V. Gatti · Journal of Public Economics Mar 2002 1,337
46 Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes * CLÁUDIO BENITO OLIVEIRA FERRAZ, Frederico Finan · The Quarterly Journal of Economics 10 Apr 2008 1,328
47 Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment Mohsin Habib, Leon Żurawicki · Journal of International Business Studies Jun 2002 1,328
48 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS Kathleen Thelen · Annual Review of Political Science Review Jun 1999 1,325
49 Courts Simeon Djankov, R. La Porta, Florencio López‐de‐Silanes et al. · The Quarterly Journal of Economics May 2003 1,258
50 What Is Governance? Francis Fukuyama · Governance 3 Mar 2013 1,257

Citations are OpenAlex's own counts, from its 2026-09-23 snapshot, so the ranking can differ from Google Scholar or Web of Science. A paper is listed for a field when OpenAlex files it under one of the field's topics; retracted papers and papers whose citation count cannot be traced to citing works are left out, and a preprint and the article it became are shown once. Release dates are OpenAlex's: where a source gave only a month or a year, that is what is shown. How the lists are chosen.