Topic · Game Theory and Applications
Most cited papers in Game Theory and Applications
What are the most cited papers in Game Theory and Applications?
The most cited paper in Game Theory and Applications is "The Structure and Function of Complex Networks" (Michael E. Newman, 2003), with 18,932 citations. Next come "Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification" (17,222) and "Theory of games and economic behavior" (16,891).
Showing 50 of 98 papers. Every paper with more than 1,171 citations is listed.
| # | Paper | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | The Structure and Function of Complex Networks Michael E. Newman · SIAM Review | 2003 | 18,932 |
| 2 | Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification Linton C. Freeman · Social Networks | 1978 | 17,222 |
| 3 | Theory of games and economic behavior Stephan Ramon Garcia, Steven J. Miller · American Mathematical Society eBooks | 12 Jun 2019 | 16,891 |
| 4 | Evolution and the Theory of Games John Maynard Smith | 1988 | 8,017 |
| 5 | Equilibrium points in n -person games John F. Nash · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences | 1950 | 7,452 |
| 6 | Maximizing the spread of influence through a social network David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, Éva Tardos | 24 Aug 2003 | 7,434 |
| 7 | A Simple Model of Herd Behavior Abhijit G. Banerjee · The Quarterly Journal of Economics | Aug 1992 | 6,671 |
| 8 | Consensus seeking in multiagent systems under dynamically changing interaction topologies Wei Ren, Randal W. Beard · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control | May 2005 | 6,633 |
| 9 | Finite-time Analysis of the Multiarmed Bandit Problem Peter L. Auer, Nicolò Cesa‐Bianchi, Paul Fischer · Machine Learning | May 2002 | 5,993 |
| 10 | A Course in Game Theory Martin John Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein | 1994 | 5,403 |
| 11 | An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger, Bernd Schwarze · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | Dec 1982 | 4,959 |
| 12 | A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence Gary S. Becker · The Quarterly Journal of Economics | Aug 1983 | 4,210 |
| 13 | Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms Элинор Остром · The Journal of Economic Perspectives | Aug 2000 | 4,107 |
| 14 | Towards a dynamic theory of strategy Michael E. Porter · Strategic Management Journal | 1991 | 3,966 |
| 15 | Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction Colin F. Camerer | 17 Mar 2003 | 3,836 |
| 16 | Potential Games Dov Monderer, Lloyd S. Shapley · Games and Economic Behavior | May 1996 | 3,567 |
| 17 | Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics Peter Taylor, Leo Jonker · Mathematical Biosciences | Jul 1978 | 3,547 |
| 18 | Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games Reinhard Selten · International Journal of Game Theory | Mar 1975 | 3,387 |
| 19 | Incentives and Prosocial Behavior Roland Bénabou, Jean Tirole · American Economic Review | Nov 2006 | 3,379 |
| 20 | Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria In‐Koo Cho, David M. Kreps · The Quarterly Journal of Economics | May 1987 | 3,364 |
| 21 | Two-Person Cooperative Games John C. M. Nash · Econometrica | 1953 | 3,228 |
| 22 | Reputation and imperfect information David M. Kreps, Robert B Wilson · Journal of Economic Theory | Aug 1982 | 3,173 |
| 23 | Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy Kenneth Joseph Arrow, Gérard Debreu, Gérard Debreu et al. · Mathematical Economics | 2 Dec 2008 | 3,093 |
| 24 | Evolutionary games on graphs György Szabó, Gábor Fáth · Physics Reports | 30 Apr 2007 | 3,040 |
| 25 | Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation Roland Bénabou, Jean Tirole · The Review of Economic Studies | Jul 2003 | 2,967 |
| 26 | 2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research John O. Ledyard · Princeton University Press eBooks | 31 Dec 1995 | 2,964 |
| 27 | Markov games as a framework for multi-agent reinforcement learning Michael L. Littman · Elsevier eBooks | 1994 | 2,722 |
| 28 | A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks Matthew O. Jackson, Asher Wolinsky · Journal of Economic Theory | Oct 1996 | 2,691 |
| 29 | Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games Richard D. McKelvey, Thomas Rossman Palfrey · Games and Economic Behavior | Jul 1995 | 2,631 |
| 30 | Complementarities and fit strategy, structure, and organizational change in manufacturing Paul Milgrom, John Heath Roberts · Journal of Accounting and Economics | Mar 1995 | 2,600 |
| 31 | Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Heath Roberts et al. · Journal of Economic Theory | Aug 1982 | 2,563 |
| 32 | Agreeing to Disagree Robert J. Aumann · The Annals of Statistics | Nov 1976 | 2,509 |
| 33 | Biological signals as handicaps Alan Grafen · Journal of Theoretical Biology | Jun 1990 | 2,507 |
| 34 | On strategic networks José-Carlos Jarillo · Strategic Management Journal | 1988 | 2,481 |
| 35 | Stochastic Games Lloyd S. Shapley · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences | Oct 1953 | 2,462 |
| 36 | Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes James D. Fearon · American Political Science Review | Sep 1994 | 2,385 |
| 37 | Online Computation and Competitive Analysis Allan Borodin, Ran El‐Yaniv | 1998 | 2,372 |
| 38 | Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction Jean‐Robert Tyran · The Journal of Socio-Economics | Dec 2003 | 2,319 |
| 39 | A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks Hisashi Ohtsuki, Christoph Hauert, E. James Lieberman et al. · Nature | May 2006 | 2,280 |
| 40 | Mixing beliefs among interacting agents Guillaume Deffuant, David B. Neau, Frédéric Amblard et al. · Advances in Complex Systems | 2000 | 2,220 |
| 41 | A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System L. S. Shapley, Martín Shubik · American Political Science Review | Sep 1954 | 2,205 |
| 42 | Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model John C. Harsanyi · Management Science | Dec 2004 | 2,173 |
| 43 | Reputation systems Paul Resnick, Ko Kuwabara, Richard Zeckhauser et al. · Communications of the ACM | Dec 2000 | 2,165 |
| 44 | Introduction to stochastic actor-based models for network dynamics Tom A. B. Snijders, Gerhard G. van de Bunt, Christian Steglich · Social Networks | 27 Mar 2009 | 2,141 |
| 45 | Groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers Lu Hong, Scott E. Page · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences | 8 Nov 2004 | 2,134 |
| 46 | Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible Элинор Остром, James M. Walker, Roy Gardner · American Political Science Review | Jun 1992 | 2,126 |
| 47 | Economic Analysis of Social Interactions Charles F. Manski · The Journal of Economic Perspectives | Aug 2000 | 2,106 |
| 48 | A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria Robert W. Rosenthal · International Journal of Game Theory | Dec 1973 | 2,060 |
| 49 | An introduction to exponential random graph (p*) models for social networks Garry L. Robins, Pip Pattison, Yuval Kalish et al. · Social Networks | 18 Oct 2006 | 2,047 |
| 50 | Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation Avner Shaked, John David Sutton · The Review of Economic Studies | 1982 | 2,028 |
Citations are OpenAlex's own counts, from its 2026-09-23 snapshot, so the ranking can differ from Google Scholar or Web of Science. A paper is listed for a field when OpenAlex files it under one of the field's topics; retracted papers and papers whose citation count cannot be traced to citing works are left out, and a preprint and the article it became are shown once. Release dates are OpenAlex's: where a source gave only a month or a year, that is what is shown. How the lists are chosen.