Most cited papers in Game Theory and Voting Systems
What are the most cited papers in Game Theory and Voting Systems?
The most cited paper in Game Theory and Voting Systems is "Social Choice and Individual Values." (G. L. S. Shackle, Kenneth Joseph Arrow, 1951), with 7,879 citations. Next come "Estimation and Inference in Econometrics." (5,584) and "A Course in Game Theory" (5,403).
Showing 50 of 100 papers. Every paper with more than 747 citations is listed.
| # | Paper | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Social Choice and Individual Values. G. L. S. Shackle, Kenneth Joseph Arrow · Economica | Nov 1951 | 7,879 |
| 2 | Estimation and Inference in Econometrics. Marcus J. Chambers, Russell Davidson, James G. MacKinnon · The Economic Journal | May 1994 | 5,584 |
| 3 | A Course in Game Theory Martin John Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein | 1994 | 5,403 |
| 4 | An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger, Bernd Schwarze · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | Dec 1982 | 4,959 |
| 5 | A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence Gary S. Becker · The Quarterly Journal of Economics | Aug 1983 | 4,210 |
| 6 | Matching As An Econometric Evaluation Estimator James J. Heckman, Hidehiko Ichimura, Petra Todd · The Review of Economic Studies | Apr 1998 | 3,872 |
| 7 | A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding Paul Milgrom, Robert James Weber · Econometrica | Sep 1982 | 3,863 |
| 8 | The concept of power Robert Alan Dahl · Systems Research and Behavioral Science | 17 Jan 2007 | 3,861 |
| 9 | “Effective” Number of Parties Markku Laakso, Rein Taagepera · Comparative Political Studies | Apr 1979 | 3,474 |
| 10 | The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. James Edward Meade, J. M. Buchanan, Gordon Tullock · The Economic Journal | Mar 1963 | 3,471 |
| 11 | Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria In‐Koo Cho, David M. Kreps · The Quarterly Journal of Economics | May 1987 | 3,364 |
| 12 | Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions Mark A. Satterthwaite · Journal of Economic Theory | Apr 1975 | 2,884 |
| 13 | The theory of decision making. Ward Edwards · Psychological Bulletin | 1954 | 2,717 |
| 14 | Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas John Michael Carey, Matthew Søberg Shugart · Electoral Studies | Dec 1995 | 2,695 |
| 15 | Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games Richard D. McKelvey, Thomas Rossman Palfrey · Games and Economic Behavior | Jul 1995 | 2,631 |
| 16 | Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading Roger B. Myerson, Mark A. Satterthwaite · Journal of Economic Theory | Apr 1983 | 2,584 |
| 17 | Stochastic Games Lloyd S. Shapley · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences | Oct 1953 | 2,462 |
| 18 | Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments Robert Stanley Forsythe, Joël L. Horowitz, Nathan Eugene Savin et al. · Games and Economic Behavior | May 1994 | 2,431 |
| 19 | Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance Lars Calmfors, John Driffill, Seppo Honkapohja et al. · Economic Policy | Apr 1988 | 2,372 |
| 20 | A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System L. S. Shapley, Martín Shubik · American Political Science Review | Sep 1954 | 2,205 |
| 21 | Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model John C. Harsanyi · Management Science | Dec 2004 | 2,173 |
| 22 | Measuring Trust* Edward L. Glaeser, David Laibson, Jose Alexandre Scheinkman et al. · The Quarterly Journal of Economics | Aug 2000 | 2,146 |
| 23 | Bargaining in Legislatures David P. Baron, John Ferejohn · American Political Science Review | Dec 1989 | 2,039 |
| 24 | Maximal Flow Through a Network L. R. Ford, D. R. Fulkerson · Birkhäuser Boston eBooks | 2009 | 1,857 |
| 25 | Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem Ehud Kalai, Meir Smorodinsky · Econometrica | May 1975 | 1,831 |
| 26 | A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames James W. Friedman · The Review of Economic Studies | 1971 | 1,821 |
| 27 | Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs W. David Montgomery · Journal of Economic Theory | Dec 1972 | 1,809 |
| 28 | The assignment game I: The core Lloyd S. Shapley, Martín Shubik · International Journal of Game Theory | Dec 1971 | 1,737 |
| 29 | Discrete Choice with Social Interactions William A. Brock, Steven N. Durlauf · The Review of Economic Studies | Apr 2001 | 1,721 |
| 30 | Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Ulrich Kamecke, Alvin E. Roth, Marcos Sotomayor · Economica | Nov 1992 | 1,692 |
| 31 | An Economic Model of Representative Democracy Tim Besley, Stephen Coate · The Quarterly Journal of Economics | Feb 1997 | 1,683 |
| 32 | Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies Robert J. Aumann · Journal of Mathematical Economics | Mar 1974 | 1,677 |
| 33 | School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Tayfun Sönmez · American Economic Review | May 2003 | 1,655 |
| 34 | Cores of convex games Lloyd S. Shapley · International Journal of Game Theory | Dec 1971 | 1,650 |
| 35 | On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment Arthur J. Hosios · The Review of Economic Studies | Apr 1990 | 1,592 |
| 36 | On Second-Best National Saving and Game-Equilibrium Growth Edmund S. Phelps, Robert A. Pollak · The Review of Economic Studies | Apr 1968 | 1,486 |
| 37 | Graphs and Cooperation in Games Roger B. Myerson · Mathematics of Operations Research | Aug 1977 | 1,477 |
| 38 | On the method of bounded differences Colin McDiarmid · Cambridge University Press eBooks | 3 Aug 1989 | 1,466 |
| 39 | Estimation of a Model with Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes of a Single Latent Variable Karl G. Jöreskog, Arthur S. Goldberger · Journal of the American Statistical Association | Sep 1975 | 1,409 |
| 40 | Contest success functions Stergios Skaperdas · Economic Theory | Jun 1996 | 1,369 |
| 41 | A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates Martin John Osborne, Alan Slivinski · The Quarterly Journal of Economics | Feb 1996 | 1,295 |
| 42 | Sour Grapes. Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Mary K. Farmer, Jon Elster · The Economic Journal | Mar 1984 | 1,285 |
| 43 | The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory Alvin E. Roth · Journal of Political Economy | Dec 1984 | 1,250 |
| 44 | An Introduction to Sample Selection Bias in Sociological Data Richard A. Berk · American Sociological Review | Jun 1983 | 1,230 |
| 45 | Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality Eric S. Maskin · The Review of Economic Studies | 1999 | 1,227 |
| 46 | The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data Joshua David Clinton, Simon D. Jackman, Douglas Rivers · American Political Science Review | May 2004 | 1,205 |
| 47 | The Resolution of Conflict Michael B. Nicholson · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A (General) | 1967 | 1,171 |
| 48 | The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare. Alan Hamlin, Robert Sugden · The Economic Journal | Sep 1987 | 1,170 |
| 49 | Bias in computer systems Batya Friedman, Helen F. Nissenbaum · ACM Transactions on Information Systems | Jul 1996 | 1,151 |
| 50 | A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas‐Colell · Econometrica | Sep 2000 | 1,114 |
Citations are OpenAlex's own counts, from its 2026-09-23 snapshot, so the ranking can differ from Google Scholar or Web of Science. A paper is listed for a field when OpenAlex files it under one of the field's topics; retracted papers and papers whose citation count cannot be traced to citing works are left out, and a preprint and the article it became are shown once. Release dates are OpenAlex's: where a source gave only a month or a year, that is what is shown. How the lists are chosen.